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ABSTRACT
We study the determinants of vertical integration in a new dataset of over 750,000 firms from 93
countries.  Existing  evidence  suggests  the  presence  of  large  cross-country  differences  in  the
organization of firms, which may be related to differences in financial development, contracting
costs or regulation. We find cross-country correlations between vertical integration on the one hand
and financial development, contracting costs, and entry barriers on the other that are consistent with
these "priors". Nevertheless, we also show that these correlations are almost entirely driven by
industrial composition; countries with more limited financial development, higher contracting costs
or greater entry barriers are concentrated in industries with a high propensity for vertical integration.
Once we control for differences in industrial composition, none of these factors are correlated with
average vertical integration. However, we also find a relatively robust differential effect of financial
development across industries; countries with less-developed financial markets are significantly


















Casual empiricism suggests the presence of signi￿cant di⁄erences in the organization of pro-
duction across countries. For example, ￿rms are often thought to be larger and more vertically
integrated in less developed countries. Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) provide evidence con-
sistent with this view and suggest that this is because market and contractual relationships
are more costly in less-developed countries. Nevertheless, there has not been a systematic
analysis of cross-country di⁄erences in vertical integration and their causes. Our primary
aim in this paper is to make a ￿rst attempt at such a systematic analysis and to investigate
the relationship between various institutional characteristics and vertical integration across
countries.
Three well-established theories o⁄er predictions on how di⁄erences in (speci￿c) institu-
tional characteristics of countries should a⁄ect vertical integration. First, according to the
highly in￿ uential Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory pioneered by Williamson (1975,
1985), the internal organization of a ￿rm is designed to improve incentives and limit agency
costs. Vertical integration is perhaps the best known application of this theory. Vertical
integration encourages speci￿c investments and reduces holdup problems when markets are
imperfect.1 According to TCE, vertical integration should therefore be more prevalent when
it is harder to write long-term contracts between upstream and downstream ￿rms.
A second body of work emphasizes the importance of contracts and other relationships
between ￿rms and ￿nancial intermediaries. In this view, credit market imperfections a⁄ect
the organization of the ￿rm. Monitoring and contract enforcement are costly, so entrepre-
neurs need collateral in order to obtain ￿nancing (Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Legros and
Newman, 1996), and they may need to rely on bank ￿nancing (Diamond and Rajan, 2005,
Diamond, 2004). When credit markets have greater imperfections and when a lack of ￿nan-
cial development limits the pool of potential entrepreneurs, there should be less entry and,
most likely, larger ￿rms in a country (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Kumar, Rajan and Zingales,
1999). Larger ￿rms are more likely to produce some of their own inputs or market some of
their own outputs, so the ￿nancial view suggests that better ￿nancial institutions and credit
markets may be associated with less vertical integration.
Third, recent work by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and the
1See the surveys by Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Joskow (2005), and Whinston (2001). See also the related
but di⁄erent approach to vertical integration in the property rights theory developed by Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), which points out both the bene￿ts and the costs of vertical integration
on incentives to undertake relationship-speci￿c investments. Other important theoretical contributions in the
area of vertical integration include Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Bolton and Whinston (1992), Aghion
and Tirole (1997), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002), and Legros and Newman (2003).
1World Bank (2005) stresses the importance of regulatory barriers to entry. Ease of entry is also
found to be related to ￿rm size across countries (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2004). If there
is less entry, presumably this makes vertically integrated ￿rms more likely. Consequently, the
regulation view suggests a relationship between entry regulations and vertical integration.
To investigate the cross-country determinants of vertical integration and the role of speci￿c
institutional features emphasized by these three theories, we use a new dataset of over 750,000
￿rms from 93 countries. Our methodology follows the ￿nance literature in taking the United
States as a benchmark (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), and we combine our ￿rm-level data
with the U.S. input-output tables (which is assumed to accurately describe the technological
possibilities in other parts of the world). While there are some limitations to our data, it
nonetheless provides a new opportunity to understand how the organization of production
di⁄ers across countries. We have three sets of results.
First, we ￿nd cross-country correlations between measures of speci￿c institutions empha-
sized by the theories and vertical integration. In particular, there is more vertical integration
in countries with greater contracting costs between ￿rms, as measured by indices of contract
enforcement costs. Vertical integration is also higher in countries with less credit or greater
credit market imperfections, as indicated by a lower level of credit market development (al-
though this result is stronger in ￿rm-level data than in country-level data). Finally, vertical
integration is also higher in countries with greater barriers to entry, as measured by indices
of the regulation of entry.
Second, however, we ￿nd that these cross-country di⁄erences in vertical integration are
almost entirely accounted for by di⁄erences in industrial composition across countries. Once
we control for di⁄erences in industrial composition, contracting costs, credit market develop-
ment, and entry regulation have little explanatory power for di⁄erences in vertical integration.
Thus, it is not the case that countries with greater contracting costs, credit market imper-
fections, or entry regulations tend to be more vertically integrated in a given sector. Rather,
such countries tend to be concentrated in sectors that are naturally vertically integrated
wherever they are in the world. We document that this lack of a relationship between these
speci￿c institutional features and vertical integration is highly robust.
To further explore this phenomenon, we create an index of the "vertical integration
propensity" of each country based on its industrial composition and the natural tendency
of each industry to vertically integrate (proxied by the vertical integration of that industry
in the United States). Contracting costs, ￿nancial development, and entry regulation are all
signi￿cantly correlated with a country￿ s vertical integration propensity, and this di⁄erence in
industrial composition explains the correlation between these measures and vertical integra-
tion in regressions that do not control for industrial composition. However, because countries
with higher contracting costs, weaker ￿nancial development, and greater entry regulation are
2also typically poorer, it is again not possible to conclude that these speci￿c institutional fea-
tures are the cause of di⁄erences in vertical integration propensity. In fact, when we control
for log GDP per capita, our speci￿c measures of institutions lose signi￿cance; log GDP per
capita is a more robust predictor of the vertical integration index and of a country￿ s vertical
integration propensity.2
Overall, we conclude from this set of results that measures of contracting costs, ￿nancial
development and regulation have limited explanatory power for the level of vertical integration
in a country. These results therefore shed some doubt on the importance of these speci￿c
institutional factors in accounting for cross-country patterns of vertical integration.
Nevertheless, our third set of results suggest that di⁄erences in ￿nancial development
(and ￿nancial institutions) across countries have an important e⁄ect on vertical integration
in the more human capital and technology-intensive sectors. We document this by looking
at the e⁄ect of the interaction between ￿nancial development and industry characteristics (in
particular, physical capital, human capital and technology intensity) on vertical integration.
We ￿nd that even after controlling for industrial composition and for per capita GDP, greater
credit market development is associated with less vertical integration in industries that are
human capital and technology intensive. This suggests that a lack of ￿nancial development
may be preventing e¢ cient organization of production in relatively high-tech and high human
capital industries, though we are not able to rule out other potential explanations for this
di⁄erential e⁄ect. In any case, it has to be emphasized that even these interaction results
cannot be interpreted as causal relationships, and it may be some other (omitted) character-
istics that lead to the relationship between vertical integration and the interaction of industry
characteristics and ￿nancial development.
Our paper relates to the existing literature in a number of ways. The comparative ￿-
nance literature ￿nds that countries with less ￿nancial development will tend not to develop
in industries requiring greater external ￿nance (Rajan and Zingales 1998), but has not in-
vestigated cross-country di⁄erences in vertical integration or in the internal organization of
￿rms.3
2The e⁄ect of GDP per capita may capture the relationship between sectoral composition and the stage
of development, or the e⁄ect of some "broader" institutional features related to the enforcement of property
rights, state-society relations or political stability (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002).
3There is a large literature on vertical integration in speci￿c industries in the United States, including
Joskow￿ s (1987) seminal paper on ownership arrangements in electricity generating plants, Stuckey￿ s (1983)
study of integration between aluminium re￿neries and bauxite mines, Monteverde and Teece￿ s (1982) investi-
gation of integration in the automobile industry, Masten￿ s (1984) work on the aerospace industry, Ohanian￿ s
(1994) work on the pulp and paper industry, Klein￿ s (1988) work on the Fisher Body and General Motors
relationship, Baker and Hubbard￿ s (2001, 2003) study of the trucking industry, Lerner and Merges￿(1998)
work on the biotech sector, and Chipty￿ s (2001) paper on market foreclosure in the cable television industry.
Woodru⁄￿ s (2002) work on the Mexican footwear industry is the only paper we are aware of that provide a sys-
tematic study of vertical integration in a developing economy. Finally, Antr￿s (2003) studies the relationship
between capital intensity and outsourcing using 23 U.S. industries.
3Also related to our paper are cross-country comparative studies, including Bain (1966),
Pryor (1972), Scherer (1973), Nugent and Nabli (1992), Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999),
Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003), Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) and Klapper, Laeven,
and Rajan (2003).4 These papers typically focus on concentration, ￿rm size, and entry. Ear-
lier papers use OECD data, while more recent papers use data from the Amadeus database
for Western and Eastern Europe, or from the Worldscope database, which contains infor-
mation only for relatively large publicly traded ￿rms. Our dataset is, to the best of our
knowledge, unique in allowing us to look at a relatively broad cross-section of countries and a
large sample of ￿rms, including both private and public companies and medium-size as well
as large ￿rms. In addition, none of these studies focuses on the internal organization of the
￿rm or vertical integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data used for the study.
Section 3 reports our basic results on the relationship between vertical integration and speci￿c
measures of institutions, including results controlling for industrial composition and a series
of robustness checks. Section 4 discusses how speci￿c measures of institutions relate to the
vertical integration propensity of countries. Section 5 reports interaction results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our ￿rm-level data come from WorldBase. This database, compiled by Dun & Bradstreet
for the primary purpose of providing business contacts, contains information on millions of
public and private ￿rms around the world. For each ￿rm, WorldBase reports the 4-digit SIC
code of the primary industry in which the ￿rm operates, and the SIC codes of up to ￿ve
secondary industries, listed in descending order of importance.5 WorldBase includes data for
213 di⁄erent countries. We exclude 19 of these because they are not de￿ned as countries in
the World Bank on-line World Development Indicators database.6 In addition, because not
all of the countries in WorldBase include reporting of secondary industries, our analysis is
restricted to 93 countries for which this information is available.
4Another well-known approach, the market foreclosure theory, views vertical integration as a method of
increasing monopoly power by downstream ￿rms (e.g., Perry, 1978, Aghion and Bolton, 1987, Hart and Tirole,
1990, Ordover, Salop, and Saloner, 1990, and Chipty, 2001). We show that our results are robust to controlling
for measures of antitrust regulations (as in Dutz and Hayri, 1999). However, because the available data on
cross-country di⁄erences in antitrust regulation are more limited, we do not focus on antitrust issues in this
paper.
5In the entire sample, approximately 64% of ￿rms report one SIC code, 24% report two codes, 8% report
three codes, 2% report four codes, 1% report ￿ve codes, and less than 1% report six codes. Note that we do
not have the breakdown of sales by SIC for ￿rms active in multiple industries.
6This excludes 15 non-independent territories, three independent countries below the World Bank size
threshold, and one disputed territory. Taiwan is retained despite not being in the World Bank database.
4Our sample consists of all ￿rms in these countries in the September 2002 WorldBase ￿le,
with a maximum of 30,000 per country (a limit imposed due to cost constraints). For those
countries with more than 30,000 ￿rms, the 30,000 largest are selected, ranked by annual sales.
We include ￿rms from all industries, except those operating only in "wholesale trade" and
"retail trade" (we explain this omission below). After these adjustments to the data, we have
a base sample of 769,199 ￿rms in 93 countries.
We use the benchmark input-output accounts published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) to calculate the degree of vertical integration for each ￿rm in our sample
(see Lawson, 1997, for a discussion of the accounts). Our methodology follows the approach
of Fan and Lang (2000).7 The input-output accounts report the dollar value of each input
used to produce the output of 498 di⁄erent industries in the U.S. economy. We use the 1992
input-output accounts because these are the most recently published at the 6-digit input-
output (IO) code level. Input-output tables from the U.S. should be informative about input
￿ ows across industries, to the extent these are determined by technology. For example, in all
countries, car makers need to obtain tires, steel, and plastic from plants specialized in the
manufacture of those goods.8
We begin by matching the 4-digit SIC codes from each ￿rm in our sample with the ap-
propriate 6-digit IO code, using the BEA￿ s concordance guide (see Lawson, 1997). Following
Fan and Lang (2000), we exclude IO code 69.01 and 69.02 (wholesale and retail trade) from
our analysis because the input-output classi￿cation system does not de￿ne these categories
￿nely enough to allow meaningful vertical integration calculations ￿almost all 4-digit SIC
codes between 5000 and 5999 map into just these two IO codes.
For every pair of industries, IOi and IOj, the input-output accounts allow us to calculate
the dollar value of IOi required to produce a dollar￿ s worth of IOj in the United States. This
amount, which we call the vertical integration coe¢ cient, VIij, represents the opportunity
for vertical integration between IOi and IOj, i.e., when it is higher, there is more use of input
i in the production of output j.
Using the full set of vertical integration coe¢ cients (i.e., VIij for every IOi and IOj), we
calculate a vertical integration index for each ￿rm in our dataset. The index is denoted by







7See also Acemoglu, Aghion, Gri¢ th and Zilibotti (2004) for an application of a similar methodology on
UK data.
8The use of the same input-output table across countries is justi￿ed when all countries share the same
technology frontier and when either all production functions are Leontief or there is factor price equalization.
However, even when these stringent assumptions are not satis￿ed, we expect there to be a correlation in the
input use patterns across countries.
5where Nf is the set of industries in which ￿rm f is active and jNfj denotes the number of these
industries. In words, we ￿rst sum the VIij coe¢ cients between the ￿rm￿ s primary industry
and all industries in which the ￿rm operates. This sum represents the dollar value of inputs
from industries in which the ￿rm operates that is required to produce one dollar￿ s worth of
the ￿rm￿ s primary output. We then create a similar index vcif for secondary industries in
which a ￿rm operates. The vertical integration index is then the average of these sums for
each ￿rm, and as such represents the average opportunity for vertical integration in all lines
of a business in which the ￿rm is active.9
Across all 769,199 ￿rms in our dataset, this index ranges from 0 (i.e., no vertical inte-
gration) to 53.5 (i.e., an average of 53.5 cents worth of the inputs required to produce one
dollar￿ s worth of output are produced by industries in which the ￿rm operates).
For an example of how the vertical integration index is created, consider a Japanese
auto maker in our data (primary code 59.0301) which also has two secondary sectors in
the WorldBase data: automotive stampings (41.0201) and miscellaneous plastic products
(32.0400). The VIij coe¢ cients between these industries are as shown in the following table:
Output (j)
Autos Stampings Plastics
Autos .0043 .0000 .0000
Input (i) Stampings .0780 .0017 .0000
Plastics .0405 .0024 .0560
SUM .1228 .0041 .0560
The table shows that, for example, the VIij coe¢ cient for stampings to autos is 0.078,
indicating that 7.8 cents worth of automotive stampings are required to produce a dollar￿ s
output of autos, and this automaker has the internal capability to produce those stampings.
(Notice that industries have VIij coe¢ cients with themselves; for example, miscellaneous
plastic products are required to produce miscellaneous plastic products.) The bottom row
shows the sum of the VIij for each industry, for example, 12.3 cents worth of the inputs
required to make autos can be produced within this ￿rm. The vertical integration index for
this ￿rm, vcif, is then the average of the sums in the bottom row.10
We construct a country-level vertical integration index, denoted by vc, by averaging all vcif
in the country.11 In regressions using the country-level indices we weight the regression by the
number of ￿rms included in the average for each index (an approach analogous to performing
￿rm-level regressions). In addition, we look directly at ￿rm-level regressions. The ￿rst two
9We also conducted extensive robustness checks using only the primary (SIC) industry of each ￿rm. The
results are essentially unchanged.
10The index could also be constructed putting greater weight on the more important industries. While it
seems natural to emphasize the primary industries in the index, WorldBase does not report sales breakdowns
by industry, so the weightings would be somewhat arbitrary. We have constructed the index using di⁄erent
weighting schemes and ￿nd little di⁄erence in the results.
11We use the simple average. Weighted averages (based on sales or employees) produce similar results.
6rows of Panel A of Table 1 report descriptive statistics for the vertical integration index at
the ￿rm and country level.
Panel A of Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for the other country-level measures
we use as independent variables. Row 4 is the log of GDP per capita in 2000. Our GDP
estimates are PPP adjusted and are taken from the World Factbook.12 Row 5 reports log
population, taken from World Bank data for the year 2000.
Rows 6 and 7 of Table 1 report our two primary measures of contracting institutions. Row
6 reports the cost of enforcing a commercial contract, i.e., between two ￿rms, from the World
Bank (2004) Doing Business dataset. This is the cost of enforcing a debt contract worth
50% of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. The cost is measured as a percent of the
amount of the debt contract. Row 7 reports the number of procedures needed to collect the
same contract, again from World Bank (2004). This variable is emphasized in the underlying
academic study, Djankov et al (2003).
In Rows 8 and 9 we report our two primary measures of credit market development. Our
￿rst credit market measure, in Row 8, directly captures the availability of external ￿nance.
This is the value of domestic credit provided to the private sector (as a percent of GDP),
taken from World Bank data for the year 2000. This measure has been used frequently in
other work (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Row 9 reports our second measure, the cost
of creating collateral, as a percent of GDP per capita. Property has to be registered before
it can be used as collateral, and the analysis of the World Bank (2005) suggests this is an
important component of the costs of borrowing from the banking system.
Rows 10 and 11 report our two primary measures of entry regulation. Row 10 presents
entry costs by new ￿rms in each country (as a percent of GDP per capita). These data are
available for 61 countries in our sample. They are obtained from the World Bank (2004)
and are constructed using the methodology in Djankov et al (2002). In Row 11 we report an
alternative measure of entry barriers ￿the number of procedures needed for entry.
In robustness checks, we use other measures of contracting costs, credit market develop-
ment, and entry barriers, with very similar results (see Appendix Table A3). Appendix Table
A1 reports correlation coe¢ cients of the country-level variables. The other rows of Panel A
in Table 1 report summary statistics on the vertical integration propensity by country (Row
3, discussed in Section 4), and the number of employees per ￿rm (Row 12). Panel B reports
characteristics of relevant industries from U.S. data (discussed in Section 5).
12On the web at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. This covers a larger sample than the
World Bank GDP estimates, and the two estimates are very similar for the countries for which they overlap.
73 Determinants of Vertical Integration
3.1 Country-level Results
According to theories emphasizing the role of contracting institutions in the internal orga-
nization of the ￿rm, such as Williamson (1975, 1985), we should see a negative correlation
between vertical integration and the quality of contracting institutions. Theories built on
credit market constraints would suggest a negative association between vertical integration
and credit market development. Finally, models of entry posit a relationship between vertical
integration and entry barriers. Consequently, we would expect these variables to be corre-
lated with cross-country di⁄erences in vertical integration. We investigate this question in
Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 uses aggregate data, while Table 3 uses ￿rm-level data.
Table 2 shows the relationship between aggregate indices of vertical integration and our
speci￿c measures of institutions. The following simple model is estimated by OLS:
vc = x0
c￿ + "c; (1)
where vc is our index of aggregate vertical integration for country c calculated as described in
the previous section, xc is a vector of country-level variables including the speci￿c measures
of institutions, and "c is an error term capturing all omitted factors. We do not interpret
equation (1) as capturing a causal relationship, but as a convenient way of describing the
correlation between speci￿c measures of institutions and vertical integration around the world.
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2 present results for our measures of contracting costs.
Column 1 uses the cost of enforcing a contract. This variable is positive, with a coe¢ cient of
1.72 and a standard error of 0.53. When contracting costs are higher, there is more vertical
integration, as predicted by TCE. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1, Panel A, which
shows graphically the positive relationship between contracting costs and vertical integration.
In Column 2 of Table 2 we add log population to control for country size, and the coe¢ cient
on contract enforcement cost decreases in magnitude, but remains signi￿cant. Column 3 uses
the number of procedures needed to enforce a contract. The results are similar to those in
Column 1 ￿the coe¢ cient on contract enforcement procedures is positive and signi￿cant,
as would be predicted by TCE. A one standard deviation reduction in the cost of enforcing
contracts is associated with between 1/4 and 1/2 a standard deviation fall in the country-level
vertical integration propensity, which is a large e⁄ect.
Columns 4 through 6 present results for our measures of credit market development.
Columns 4 and 5 show that the coe¢ cient on credit market development is negative, which
suggests that stronger ￿nancial development is associated with less vertical integration. Nev-
ertheless, the coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1, Panel
B, which shows a weak negative relationship between credit market development and vertical
8integration. Column 6 of Table 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on cost to create collateral is
neither signi￿cant nor of the expected sign. In the country-level regressions, there appears
to be little evidence that credit market development is related to vertical integration.
Columns 7 through 9 present results for the two measures of entry regulation. Column 7
uses the cost of entry. This variable has a positive e⁄ect, with a coe¢ cient of 1.28 and a stan-
dard error of 0.30. This positive relationship is consistent with priors; higher entry costs are
associated with greater vertical integration, and the e⁄ect is large; a one standard deviation
fall in entry costs is associated with about a 1/2 standard deviation decline in country-level
vertical integration. Panel C of Figure 1 shows this signi￿cant positive relationship graphi-
cally. Column 8 show that this relationship holds when we control for log population, and
Column 9 shows that the relationship holds with our second measure of entry regulation, the
number of procedures required for entry.
3.2 Firm-level Results
In Table 3 we repeat the regressions of Table 2 using ￿rm-level data.
A potential concern with the results in this paper is sample selection. Our dataset contains
di⁄erent numbers of ￿rms from di⁄erent countries, and this variation in the selection of
samples of ￿rms could be a source of variation in vertical integration. The main source
of the problem would be potential correlation between vertical integration and ￿rm size
(combined with di⁄erential selection on ￿rm size across countries). For example, it could be
that relatively larger companies are more vertically integrated and from countries with weaker
institutional environments we only observe relatively larger companies. We can partially deal
with this sample selection problem by estimating our main equation at the ￿rm level, and
controlling for ￿rm size. In other words, the estimating equation now becomes
vcf = x0
c￿ + z0
f￿ + "cf; (2)
where vcf is vertical integration in ￿rm f in country c, xc is the set of country-level covariates
as before, and zf is a set of ￿rm-level covariates. Because the variables of interest, our speci￿c
measures of institutions, vary only at the country level, whenever we report regressions of
this sort, the standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level.
Table 3 reports the results from the estimation of (2) (with the log of the number of
employees included as a measure of ￿rm size).13 The general pattern is the same as in the
country-level regressions in Table 2. On the whole, the results are somewhat stronger and
more precise.
13We also experimented with regressions controlling for second, third and fourth order polynomials in ￿rm
size, and found very similar results (details available upon request).
9Columns 1 through 3 again show that our measures of contracting costs are positively
correlated with vertical integration, as would be predicted by TCE. The magnitude and
signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients is greater that the comparable estimates in Table 2 in all three
columns. However, the standard deviation of the ￿rm-level vertical integration index is much
larger than the standard deviation of the country-level vertical integration index, so the
implied e⁄ect of contracting costs on vertical integration is smaller (about 1/4 of the size in
Table 2).
Columns 4 through 6 now report a statistically signi￿cant correlation between credit
market development and vertical integration. In particular, the coe¢ cient on domestic credit
to the private sector is now -0.34 with a standard error of 0.15. As would be predicted,
greater ￿nancial development is associated with less vertical integration. The measure of the
cost to create collateral remains insigni￿cant at the ￿rm level.14
Columns 7 through 9 again show that our measures of entry regulation are positively
correlated with vertical integration. With these measures, the ￿rm-level results are somewhat
smaller than the corresponding country-level results.
Overall, the country-level and ￿rm-level regressions show that the measures of contracting
institutions, credit market development, and regulation policy all appear to be correlated with
the level of vertical integration in a country.
3.3 Industrial Composition
The results in Tables 2 and 3 documented the cross-country correlation between speci￿c
measures of institutions and the aggregate level of vertical integration. However, a missing
element in our analysis thus far has been the lack of a control for di⁄erences in industrial com-
position across countries. It could be, for example, that countries with weaker institutional
environments have economic activity concentrated in sectors that naturally have greater ver-
tical integration. The simplest strategy to investigate whether industrial composition is an
important concern is to include a full set of industry dummies in the ￿rm-level regressions.
Consequently, the estimating equation becomes:
vcif = x0
c￿ + z0
f￿ + ￿i + "cif; (3)
where vcif is vertical integration of ￿rm f in industry i of country c, xc and zf are country-
level and ￿rm-level covariates as before, and most importantly, the ￿i￿ s are a full set of
industry dummies. The presence of the dummies enables the model to capture cross-industry
di⁄erences in the technological or other determinants of vertical integration. The industry
14We also performed additional tests with accounting standards as the explanatory variable. While we ￿nd
that better accounting standards are also associated with less vertical integration, the relationship is somewhat
weaker statistically (a coe¢ cient of -0.99 with a standard error of 0.55). This result may be attributed to the
fact that the accounting standards variable is only available for 30 of our sample countries.
10dummies are de￿ned at the two-digit IO level, which results in a set of 76 dummy variables.15
As with the estimates of equation (2), we cluster the standard errors at the country level to
take account of the fact that the key explanatory variables do not vary by ￿rm (or industry).
The inclusion of a full set of industry dummies implies that in equation (3), all cross-
country comparisons are relative to the "mean propensity to integrate" in a particular indus-
try. In other words, this regression looks at, for example, whether ￿rms in a country with
worse contracting institutions are more of vertically integrated relative to ￿rms in a country
with better contracting institutions in the same industry.
Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of equation (3) with the full set of industry
dummies included. The striking result is that there is no longer a signi￿cant relationship
between any of the measures of speci￿c institutions and vertical integration; the exception
is the cost of creating collateral, but this has the "wrong" sign. Evidently, the correlation
between speci￿c institutional factors and vertical integration depicted in Tables 2 and 3 was
primarily due to di⁄erences in the industrial composition of production across countries.
As a result, there is no evidence that, within a given industry, vertical integration is more
prevalent in countries with greater contracting costs, weaker credit market development, or
greater entry regulation.
More speci￿cally, as we document in greater detail in the next section, countries with
worse contracting institutions, more limited ￿nancial development and higher entry barriers
are more concentrated in industries that have typically higher vertical integration, such as
mining (ferrous and nonferrous), petroleum and gas, leather, fabrics, chemicals, apparel, and
electronic components.
The lack of a correlation between our speci￿c measures of institutions and vertical inte-
gration can be interpreted in di⁄erent ways. One possibility is that our measures of speci￿c
institutions do not adequately capture cross-country di⁄erences in these factors. Naturally,
the various proxies for contracting institutions, ￿nancial development, and regulation policy
are imperfect and potentially measured with error. Nevertheless, in addition to the results
of Tables 2 and 3, previous work shows that these indices do have signi￿cant information
content, and are correlated with economic outcomes (see, e.g., Djankov et al, 2002, 2003).
Thus the lack of correlation between these measures and vertical integration is unlikely to be
driven entirely by measurement error.
A second interpretation is that, even if these institutional factors do not a⁄ect the degree
to which a given ￿rm chooses to vertically integrate, they have an impact on economic out-
comes across countries by in￿ uencing industrial composition. We investigate this possibility
in the next section.
15We use the primary industry of each ￿rm, i.e., the IO code matched to the SIC code that comes ￿rst in
WorldBase.
11The ￿nal possibility is simply that these speci￿c institutions have no impact on average
vertical integration across countries. Such an interpretation would be a challenge to the
theories discussed in the introduction, which (implicitly or explicitly) suggest that di⁄erences
in contracting costs, credit markets, or regulation policy should have a major e⁄ect on cross-
country patterns of vertical integration. We will see in Section 5 that this interpretation
needs to be quali￿ed; one of these factors, ￿nancial development, has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
vertical integration in the human capital and technology-intensive industries.
3.4 Robustness Checks
Before investigating the relationship between speci￿c institutions and vertical integration
further, we present a series of robustness checks of our results to this point. We verify
that without controls for industry, the correlation between speci￿c institutions and vertical
integration is robust. In addition we show that the lack of a correlation between these
variables after controlling for industry is also robust with two minor exceptions.
In Table 5 we present a series of three robustness checks. In this table we alternate
columns of ￿rm-level results without industry dummies, as in equation (2), with columns
of ￿rm-level results with industry dummies, as in equation (3). We present each robustness
check only for our ￿rst proxy for each of the three types of institutions.
Panel A of Table 5 reports results for manufacturing industries only. We de￿ne "man-
ufacturing" industries according to the BEA￿ s classi￿cation, which means we exclude basic
industries (such as agriculture and mining), and service industries (such as lodging, repair
services, legal services, and health services), as well as transportation, communications, util-
ities, and ￿nance-related industries. Columns 1 and 2 show that contracting costs remain
signi￿cant in this sample, but lose signi￿cance once industry dummies are included. Columns
3 and 4 show that greater credit market development is associated with less vertical integra-
tion in this sample, and that the signi￿cance disappears when industry dummies are included.
Columns 5 and 6 show that entry regulation remains signi￿cant in this sample, but once again
not when industry dummies are included.
Panel B of Table 5 presents results excluding the most and least vertically integrated
industries in the sample. The purpose of this robustness check is to assess if results are
driven by a small number of industries that technologically have a high or low level of vertical
integration. We rank the vertical integration of industries by estimating vertical integration
coe¢ cients (dummies) for each industry in a ￿rm-level regression of vertical integration on
industry dummies using only U.S. data. We use U.S. data since vertical integration patterns
in the United States are likely to be most informative about the tendency of industries
to vertically integrate their activities in an environment with relatively developed ￿nancial
markets and contracting institutions (and relatively free entry). These estimated dummy
12coe¢ cients are reported in Appendix Table A2 and the methodology is discussed further in
the next section. The results in Panel B of Table 5 are similar to those in Panel A, and
show that our ￿ndings are robust to this change. The exception is that the coe¢ cient on
domestic credit to the private sector is now slightly below standard levels of signi￿cance
without industry dummies (Column 3).
Panel C of Table 5 presents results that include only industries that are present in 90%
of the countries in our sample. The purpose here is to assess if our results are driven by
industries that only appear in a small subset of countries in the sample. Panel C shows that
this is not the case. The results are similar to those presented previously ￿the institutional
measures have strong explanatory power when industry dummies are not included, but very
little explanatory power when industry dummies are included. As in Panel B, this is only
weakly true for the ￿nancial development measure, which is now not signi￿cant in Column
3.
In Table 6 we further check the robustness of our results by repeating the test using
an alternative database. For this robustness check, we use the Worldscope database, which
has been used extensively in the previous literature. It should be noted, however, that for
the purposes of this paper, Worldscope is not as well suited to the investigation here as
our primary data source, WorldBase. From WorldBase we get over 50 times the number of
observations as in Worldscope, with data from roughly twice as many countries. In addition,
WorldBase includes privately held and medium-sized ￿rms, whereas Worldscope only includes
large, publicly traded ￿rms.
Panel A of Table 6 reports results of regressions similar to those reported previously, but
with the methodology described earlier now repeated on the Worldscope database. Panel
A of Table 6 shows that the results are similar using the Worldscope database. Column 1
shows that the coe¢ cient on contracting costs is 1.82, very close to the 1.86 obtained in our
baseline results. The standard error is higher than in the baseline results, perhaps because the
number of countries included in the regression is fewer, so that the coe¢ cient is slightly below
standard levels of signi￿cance. Column 2 shows that, as in our baseline results, contracting
costs have little explanatory power when industry dummies are included.
Column 3 of Panel A shows that the coe¢ cient on credit market development is -1.27,
with a standard error of 0.35, which is a considerably stronger result than in our baseline
results. Furthermore, in contrast to our baseline results, Column 4 shows that although the
coe¢ cient on ￿nancial development is weakened when industry dummies are included, the
coe¢ cient remains signi￿cant and is one of the two exceptions to the general pattern of the
signi￿cant e⁄ects disappearing once industry dummies are included.
Column 5 of Panel A shows that the coe¢ cient on the entry cost is 2.16, with a standard
error of 0.94, which is somewhat stronger than our baseline results. Again, Column 6 shows
13the signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient disappears when industry dummies are included.
Another concern with the results is that we have not so far incorporated information on
business groups, which are important particularly in a number of Asian countries (see, for
example, Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Panel B of Table 6 investigates this issue. We adjust
the Worldscope data for group a¢ liations for Asian countries using data from Claessens et
al (2000).16 In this adjustment, we treat all ￿rms belonging to the same business group as a
single entity, and aggregate their ￿rm-level data accordingly.
Panel B reports the group-adjusted results. In general, the results are similar to the
unadjusted results shown in Panel A. The coe¢ cients on the institutional measures are greater
than the corresponding measures in Panel A when industry dummies are not included. With
industry dummies included, the coe¢ cient on domestic credit to the private sector remains
negative and marginally signi￿cant, though with a substantially smaller magnitude than in
Panel A.
Additional robustness checks in Appendix Table A3 show that alternative measures of
speci￿c institutions are also correlated with vertical integration. The results are robust to
measuring contracting costs as the time required to enforce a contract or the procedural
complexity of contract enforcement (as in Djankov et al, 2003), to measuring credit market
development as the disclosure index (from World Bank, 2005) and the interest rate spread
between lending and borrowing rates (from World Bank data from 2000), and to measuring
entry costs as the time required for entry (as in Djankov, et al, 2002). In addition, Table
A3 shows that stronger antitrust regulation is associated with less vertical integration (with
antitrust measured as in Dutz and Hayri, 1999). In all cases, there is a correlation between
vertical integration in these speci￿c institutions, and this correlation disappears when we
include industry dummies (i.e., when we control for industrial composition).
4 Vertical Integration Propensity
We now investigate the reason why the signi￿cant correlation between vertical integration and
our measures of speci￿c institutions disappears when industry dummies are included in the









where ^ ￿i￿ s are the estimates of the industry dummies (reported in Table A2) from a ￿rm-level
regression of vertical integration on industry dummies using U.S. data, Sci is total sales in
16We are unable to do any such adjustments to our primary dataset because our data do not include ￿rm
names.
14industry i in country c, and Sc is total sales in country c. The dummies ^ ￿i￿ s measure the
average level of vertical integration in industry i in the U.S., so ^ Vc measures the average
tendency for vertical integration in the country due to its industrial composition. In other
words, ^ Vc measures the extent of vertical integration in a country if the country had the
average level of vertical integration in the United States corresponding to each industry.17
Consequently, the source of variation in ^ Vc arises purely from the industrial composition of
the country.
In Table 7, we report results from regressions similar to those in equation (1), but with
the vertical integration propensity of each country, ^ Vc, as the dependent variable. The ex-
planatory variables are the speci￿c measures of institutions as used previously. The results
in Panel A of Table 7 show a strong correlation between speci￿c measures of institutions
and vertical integration propensity. Vertical integration propensity is signi￿cantly higher in
countries with high contracting costs (Columns 1 and 2), in countries with high costs to
create collateral (Column 4) and in countries with high entry regulations (Columns 5 and 6).
Stronger credit market development is also associated with less vertical integration propen-
sity, though this e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant (Column 3). In Column 7, we include
all measures simultaneously. In this regression, contract enforcement costs and procedures
required for entry emerge as having the most signi￿cant correlations with vertical integration
propensity.
Figure 2 illustrates graphically the relationships reported in the regressions of Table 7.
Panel A shows a strong positive relationship between contracting costs and vertical integra-
tion propensity, Panel B shows a negative (but not signi￿cant) relationship between credit
market development and vertical integration propensity, and Panel C shows a strong positive
relationship between entry costs and vertical integration propensity.
The results in Panel A of Table 7 illustrate why the correlation between vertical integration
and speci￿c measures of institutions disappears when we control for industrial composition
(industry dummies). Countries with weaker institutions, as measured by contracting costs,
credit market development, and entry regulation, tend to be concentrated in industries with a
high technological propensity for vertical integration. Consequently, when we do not control
for industrial composition, we see sizable di⁄erences in vertical integration across countries,
but when we take into account of these di⁄erences in industrial composition, the correlations
disappear.
How should these results be interpreted? On the one hand, the relationship between the
speci￿c institutional features and vertical integration propensity might itself re￿ ect omitted
17In alternative tests we have also calculated the industry dummy coe¢ cients using data from all G7 nations
and also using data from all 93 countries in our dataset. The results are very similar to our baseline results
and are available upon request.
15factors.18 On the other hand, it is plausible that this relationship could be related to the
e⁄ect of these speci￿c institutional characteristics on the industrial composition of a country.
The evidence we present next favors the former interpretation.
Panel B of Table 7 repeats the regressions of Panel A, but also including log GDP per
capita as an additional explanatory variable. GDP per capita is a potential control both
for the e⁄ect of the stage of development on industrial composition and may also capture
the e⁄ect of other (broader) institutional features that are omitted from the regression. The
results in Panel B indicate that the explanatory power of per capita GDP subsumes the
explanatory power of the speci￿c measures of institutions. In Column 1, for example, per
capita GDP has a coe¢ cient of -0.69, with a standard error of 0.14, whereas the coe¢ cient on
contract enforcement costs is insigni￿cant. The results are similar in other columns; contract
enforcement procedures is the only measure that is signi￿cant, but it has the opposite of the
sign it had without GDP (negative rather than positive).
Panel B shows that the most robust relationship is that richer countries are more concen-
trated in industries with lower vertical integration propensity. The strong negative relation-
ship between log GDP per capita and vertical integration propensity is shown graphically in
Panel D of Figure 2.19
One concern with Table 7 is that the vertical integration propensity measure, ^ Vc, con-
structed using industrial composition of countries based on our primary data source, which
may not be as representative of the overall industrial composition as some other international
datasets. To address this concern, we repeat the analysis of Table 7, calculating ^ Vc using
industrial composition calculated from an alternative data source. Of the alternative data
sources available, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) data-
base is probably best suited to the task. While the country coverage is not as extensive as
WorldBase, it is available for a large number of countries and o⁄ers good coverage of industrial
composition in those countries. UNIDO does not o⁄er ￿rm-level data, but its industry-level
data is su¢ cient for calculating ^ Vc when combined with our estimates of vertical integration
coe¢ cients, ^ ￿i￿ s, from our WorldBase dataset.
Accordingly, we calculate the vertical integration propensity, ^ Vc, as de￿ned above, but
with industrial composition of countries, Sci=Sc, calculated from the UNIDO database. Table
8 reports results of regressions using this measure of ^ Vc. Panel A shows results without log
18Potentially important among these omitted factors are broad institutional characteristics, related to prop-
erty rights enforcement, corruption, state-society relations and political stability, as well as any e⁄ect on the
stage of economic development on industrial composition. Appendix Table A1 shows that the correlation of
per capita GDP with the speci￿c institutional measures is generally high, suggesting that such omitted e⁄ects
could be important.
19These results are not inconsistent with a view in which these speci￿c measures of institutions indirectly
a⁄ect vertical integration propensity through their e⁄ect on per capita GDP. Nevertheless, since many other
factors a⁄ect GDP per capita, we do not ￿nd this view compelling.
16GDP per capita. The results are generally similar to those in Panel A of Table 7. All our
measures of speci￿c institutions have coe¢ cients of the same sign as in Table 7. All but two
of the coe¢ cients that were signi￿cant in Table 7 are signi￿cant in Table 8, a di⁄erence that
may be attributable to the smaller number of countries included in the regressions in Table
8. Panel B of Table 8 shows that, again, per capita GDP dominates the speci￿c measures
of institutions in explaining vertical integration propensity. Though not always signi￿cant in
this sample of countries, per capita GDP shows a strong negative correlation with a country￿ s
vertical integration propensity.
We further investigate the relationship between log GDP per capita and vertical integra-
tion in Table 9. Because, as Tables 7 and 8 show, per capita GDP has a strong correlation
with vertical integration propensity, we would expect that per capita GDP would also be
correlated with the vertical integration index. In Panel A of Table 9 we estimate ￿rm-level
regressions without industry dummies as in equation (2), and in Panel B we estimate regres-
sions with industry dummies as in equation (3), and in each case per capita GDP is included
as the main coe¢ cient of interest. Panel A demonstrates a signi￿cant negative correlation
between per capita GDP and vertical integration, which is consistent with the relationship
between this variable and the vertical integration propensity (and is also consistent with "pri-
ors"). For example, in Column 1, the coe¢ cient on per capita GDP is -0.48, with a standard
error of 0.11, indicating that there is less vertical integration in richer countries. Columns
2 through 7 show that this relationship holds when we control for each of our measures of
speci￿c institutions. At the same time, the coe¢ cients on the measures of speci￿c institutions
themselves are not signi￿cant. Panel A further demonstrates that the explanatory power of
per capita income subsumes the explanatory power of speci￿c institutional factors. Panel
D of Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between per capita GDP and vertical integration
graphically.
Despite the strong correlations in Panel A, Panel B of Table 9 shows that even this
relationship does not hold when we control for industrial composition. In Panel B, the
coe¢ cient on log GDP per capita is now positive and generally not signi￿cant. Evidently,
the entire correlation between GDP per capita and vertical integration is also due to industrial
composition (or due to the relationship between GDP per capita and the vertical integration
propensity, documented above).
Overall, we conclude that there is no evidence that any of the speci￿c institutional features
we have focused on or per capita income are systematically related to vertical integration
once we take into account di⁄erences in industrial composition associated with the level of
economic development.
175 Di⁄erential E⁄ects Across Industries
The results in the previous sections may suggest that there are no robust regularities in
cross-country vertical integration patterns once we control for industrial composition. In this
section, we show that this is not entirely true by looking at the di⁄erential e⁄ects of these
characteristics across industries.
The regression equations so far impose a "constant e⁄ect" of speci￿c institutional char-
acteristics on vertical integration. Another possibility is that these characteristics have dif-
ferential e⁄ects across industries. For example, some industries may be systematically more
vertically integrated in countries with weak institutions while other industries are more verti-
cally integrated in countries with strong institutions. This might result, for instance, if both
market transactions and contracting relationships within ￿rms are more imperfect in poor
countries, but also avoiding market imperfections are more important for some industries
(leading to more vertical integration), whereas contracting problems make vertical integra-
tion more problematic for other industries.
5.1 Speci￿cations with Interaction E⁄ects
Motivated by these considerations, we estimate regressions of the following form
vcif = ￿ycmi + ￿xcmi + z0
f￿ + ￿i + ￿c + "ci: (4)
where yc represents (log) income per capita, xc represents one of our measures of speci￿c
institutions, and mi represents industry-level characteristics, such as capital intensity, human
capital intensity, and technology intensity. The main e⁄ect for mi is already taken out by the
full set of industry dummies, the ￿i￿ s. The main coe¢ cient of interest in this speci￿cation
is ￿, and for this reason, we also include in this equation a full set of country dummies,
￿c. The term ycmi is included to investigate whether the interaction is between the speci￿c
institutional features and industry characteristics as opposed to some other factor related to
income per capita (for example, a broader notion of institutional di⁄erences). As with all
speci￿cations that include interactions, all main e⁄ects are evaluated at their sample mean
values. We also include ￿rm-level characteristics, speci￿cally a measure of ￿rm size (as zf).
Estimates from equation (4) are reported in Table 10. Following the methodology in
Rajan and Zingales (1998), all of the industry-level measures are based on U.S. data. In
doing so we are assuming (analogous to assumptions made in Rajan and Zingales, 1998) that
characteristics of industries in the U.S. economy are representative of (or at the very least
correlated with) the characteristics of the same industries in other countries. Descriptive
statistics for these measures are found in Panel B of Table 1.
18We use three industry-level measures as interactions: physical capital intensity, human
capital intensity, and the ratio of o¢ ce and computing equipment to total equipment, which
we refer to as ￿technology intensity￿throughout. We take these measures from Autor, Katz
and Krueger (1998), who calculate these using data from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) for the year 1990. Physical capital intensity is de￿ned as the log of capital
investment to value added, human capital intensity is de￿ned as the log of employees (full-time
equivalent) to output, and as noted above, technology intensity is de￿ned as the log of net
capital stock in o¢ ce, computing, and accounting machinery to total net capital equipment.
We use the concordance that these authors developed to map the NIPA industries to our IO
industries.
The interaction of log GDP per capita with the industry characteristic is not included in
Panel A of Table 10, but is added in Panel B. Columns 1 through 3 present results with phys-
ical capital intensity as the industry characteristic. Panel A shows that the strongest e⁄ect is
for credit market development interacted with capital intensity (Column 2). The coe¢ cient
of 0.42, with a standard error of 0.16, would suggest that ￿rms in capital intensive industries
are more likely to be vertically integrated in countries with greater ￿nancial development.
However, in Panel B, including per capita GDP interacted with capital intensity eliminates
the signi￿cance of credit market development interacted with capital intensity.
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 10 investigate the relationship between human capital
intensity and vertical integration. In these columns, the strongest e⁄ect comes from the
interaction between ￿nancial development and human capital or technology intensity. For
example, in Column 5 of Panel A, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is -0.44, with a
standard error of 0.18. This indicates that in countries with relatively strong ￿nancial de-
velopment, vertical integration is less prevalent in human capital intensive industries. This
e⁄ect is of a reasonable magnitude. For example, the coe¢ cient estimate implies that in
countries with the strongest ￿nancial development, a movement from the lowest human cap-
ital industry to the highest is associated with about a 1/4 standard deviation fall in the
vertical integration index, whereas in countries with the weakest ￿nancial development, the
same increase in human capital intensity is associated with a 1/5 standard deviation rise in
the vertical integration index.
One concern is that this interaction e⁄ect, like the patterns in Table 7, may re￿ ect an
interaction between industry characteristics and GDP per capita. However, the estimates in
Panel B indicate that the signi￿cant interaction between ￿nancial development and human
capital intensity is robust to controlling for log GDP per capita. In fact, the coe¢ cient hardly
changes when we include the interaction between GDP per capita and industry characteristics.
Columns 7 through 9 of Table 10 look at the relationship between technology intensity
and vertical integration. As with human capital intensity, in Panel A, the strongest e⁄ect
19is again on credit market development interacted with technology intensity, which has a
negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient. Panel B shows that this result is robust to including log
GDP per capita interacted with technology intensity. The coe¢ cient on entry cost interacted
with technology intensity is also signi￿cant in Panel B, but not in Panel A.
Overall, the interaction results suggest that credit market development is an important
determinant of vertical integration in certain industries. More credit market development
appears to reduce vertical integration in technology and human capital intensive industries.
In Table 11 we perform additional tests to assess the robustness of the relationship between
vertical integration and the interaction of credit market development with human capital
intensity and technology intensity. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 we control for ￿nancial
development interacted with each industry￿ s dependence on external ￿nance. Rajan and
Zingales (1998) show that ￿nancial development has a more pronounced e⁄ect on growth
in industries that are more dependent on external ￿nance, so part of our results might be
capturing the interaction between ￿nancial dependence and ￿nancial development. To control
for this, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and calculate each industry￿ s technological
dependence on external ￿nance based on U.S. data in the CRSP database. Our measure
follows the exact de￿nition in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and is computed from U.S. data
from 1990-1999. Columns 1 and 2 show that ￿nancial development interacted with external
dependence on ￿nance has very little impact on vertical integration, whereas the interactions
of ￿nancial development with human capital intensity (Column 1) and technology intensity
(Column 2) retain signi￿cant explanatory power. In Columns 3 and 4, we repeat the tests
using an alternative measure of ￿nancial dependence from Rajan and Zingales (1998), the
industry￿ s dependence on equity (calculated from the same CRSP data). Again, this does
not a⁄ect the signi￿cance of our interactions with human capital intensity and technology
intensity. The ￿nal columns of Table 11 repeat the robustness tests of Table 5. These
columns show that our interaction results are robust to excluding the most and least vertically
integrated industries (Columns 7 and 8), and to including only industries appearing in at
least 90% of the sample countries (Columns 9 and 10). Finally, the interactions continue to
have the right sign but are no longer statistically signi￿cant when we restrict the regression
to manufacturing industries (Columns 5 and 6), which suggests that di⁄erences in vertical
integration in some high human capital service industries (such as electric and gas utilities,
repair services, and amusements) are important for the interaction results.
Overall, the results of Tables 10 and 11 illustrate an interesting pattern relating ￿nancial
development to vertical integration. They suggest that, when ￿nancial development is limited,
the greatest extent of vertical integration is to be found in industries with advanced technology
and greater than average human capital requirements.
205.2 Interpretation
How do we interpret the interaction e⁄ects reported in Tables 10 and 11? At face value, they
suggest that while ￿nancial development has little e⁄ect on average vertical integration, it
reduces vertical integration in technology-intensive and human capital-intensive sectors. This
also naturally implies that ￿nancial development must have some positive e⁄ect on vertical
integration in less technology-intensive sectors.
To interpret this pattern, let us return to the theories related to ￿nancial development.
The crux of these theories is that lack of external (bank and market) ￿nance will prevent entry
of new ￿rms and productive investment by existing ￿rms. While we may expect that this will
lead to larger and thus more vertically integrated ￿rms, in fact the opposite might also be the
case. For example, it may be e¢ cient (either technologically or because of contractual reasons)
for downstream ￿rms to integrate with their upstream suppliers, but such a relationship may
not emerge if downstream ￿rms are credit constrained. On the other hand, if upstream ￿rms
are credit constrained and cannot undertake the necessary investments, vertical integration
may occur even when it is not e¢ cient.
In this light, the patterns we document are consistent with a con￿guration whereby in
countries with limited ￿nancial development, low-tech sectors are insu¢ ciently integrated,
while high-tech sectors are excessively integrated. To investigate this issue further, we looked
for evidence that the productivity implications of vertical integration are di⁄erent depending
on industry characteristics. In particular, we estimated models with productivity (sales per
employee) on the left hand side and the triple interaction of ￿nancial development, the ￿rm-
level vertical integration index and human capital intensity and also human capital intensity
squared (or technology intensity and technology intensity squared) on the right hand side.20
If both high vertical integration in the high-tech sectors and low vertical integration in the
low-tech sectors of ￿nancially less-developed countries is ine¢ cient, we may expect a non-
monotonic e⁄ect of the triple interaction (so that vertical integration in ￿nancially less-
developed countries is associated with lower productivity speci￿cally in the sector with the
lowest or highest technology or human capital needs). This exercise did not show a non-
monotonic pattern (results available upon request). This may re￿ ect the fact that some
other mechanism is responsible for the di⁄erential e⁄ects of ￿nancial development, or it may
result from the crudeness of the productivity measures in the WorldBase dataset. Further
investigation of the nature and cause of these di⁄erential e⁄ects is an area for future research.
20And naturally we also included all the second level interactions, so that the triple interaction does not
capture their omitted e⁄ects.
216 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the cross-country determinants of vertical integration in a new
dataset of over 750,000 ￿rms from 93 countries. Our focus was on the e⁄ect of speci￿c
institutional features on the vertical integration decisions of ￿rms. This focus was motivated
by both empirics and theory. Casual empiricism and existing work suggest that there are
large di⁄erences in the organization of production and ￿rms across countries and this may
be related to contracting problems. Relatedly, a body of in￿ uential theories suggest that
contracting costs (contracting institutions), credit market development and regulation should
be important determinants of vertical integration.
Our empirical results do not con￿rm the main predictions of these theories. Although
there is a cross-country correlation between vertical integration on the one hand and contract-
ing costs, ￿nancial development, and entry barriers on the other, we show that this is entirely
driven by industrial composition. In particular, countries with higher contracting costs or
more limited ￿nancial development are concentrated in industries with a high propensity for
vertical integration. Once we control for di⁄erences in industrial composition, none of these
factors seem to a⁄ect vertical integration.
Nevertheless, our results also point to a signi￿cant relationship between ￿nancial devel-
opment and vertical integration. We ￿nd a relatively robust di⁄erential e⁄ect of ￿nancial
development across industries: countries with less-developed ￿nancial markets are signi￿-
cantly more integrated in industries that are more human capital or technology intensive.
We view our paper as a ￿rst step in understanding the cross-country patterns of organi-
zation of ￿rms. Despite the importance of the organization of production for productivity
and the existence of various in￿ uential theories, we know very little about these patterns.
The dataset and the approach in this paper can be useful in investigating other dimensions
of di⁄erences in the organization of ￿rms across countries.
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.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Manufacturing industries only
Contract enforcement cost 1.16 0.08
(0.31) (0.48)
Credit market development -0.50 -0.11
(0.18) (0.12)
Entry cost 1.05 0.20
(0.28) (0.28)
Log population 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.18 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Log number of employees 0.26 0.17 0.29 0.18 0.26 0.17
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.40
Number of Observations 253,614 253,614 239,093 239,093 253,614 253,614
Panel B: Most and least vertically integrated industries excluded
Contract enforcement cost 1.00 -0.09
(0.31) (0.46)
Credit market development -0.20 -0.03
(0.16) (0.15)
Entry cost 0.85 0.11
(0.25) (0.25)
Log population 0.16 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Log number of employees 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.32
Number of Observations 544,067 544,067 531,300 531,300 544,067 544,067
Panel C: Industries appearing in at least 90% of countries only
Cost to enforce a contract 1.46 -0.14
(0.46) (0.47)
Domestic credit to the private sector -0.35 0.04
(0.20) (0.15)
Cost of entry 1.23 0.10
(0.31) (0.25)
Log population 0.23 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.25 0.02
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Log number of employees 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.04
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.39
Number of Observations 567,179 567,179 560,644 560,644 567,179 567,179
Dependent variable is the vertical integration index
Table 5
Robustness checks (firm level)
The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on
specific measures of institutions. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in
parentheses. In specified columns, industry dummies, defined at the two-digit input-output level, are
also estimated but not reported. In Panel B, "most and least vertically industries" includes the 5% most
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Health/Education Services -5.93 Radio/TV Broadcasting -1.68
Maintenance Construction -5.53 Manufacturing, Misc. -1.56
Furniture, Household -5.42 Machinery, Farm -1.50
Household Appliances -5.39 New Construction -1.31
Automotive Service -5.10 Machinery, Service Industry -1.27
Wood Containers -4.70 Industrial Equipment -1.18
Eating/Drinking Places -4.31 Utilities -1.15
Furniture, Commercial -4.27 Food -0.91
Lodging/Personal Services -4.23 Rubber -0.84
Ordnance -3.90 Paints -0.79
Machinery, Industrial -3.73 Textiles, Fabricated -0.63
Ag/Forestry/Fishery Services -3.72 Finance/Insurance -0.49
Screw Machine/Stamping -3.63 Mining, Chemical 0.05
Electrical, Misc. -3.55 Engines 0.09
Footwear/Other Leather -3.47 Motor Vehicles 0.38
Electric Lighting -3.44 Real Estate 0.65
Scientific Instruments -3.31 Transportation 1.26
Mining, Nonmetallic -3.04 Metal Containers 1.44
Printing/Publishing -3.04 Aircraft 1.53
Other Transportation Equipment -2.89 Iron/Steel Manufacturing 1.57
Heating/Plumbing Fabrication -2.87 Petroleum Refining 1.79
Optical Equipment -2.81 Drugs/Cleansers 2.38
Machinery, Special -2.68 Glass 2.66
Audio/Video Equipment -2.65 Plastics 2.90
Machinery, Metalworking -2.56 Computer/Office Equipment 3.31
Paperboard Containers -2.52 Mining, Coal 4.71
Stone/Clay -2.37 Electronic Components 4.91
Forestry/Fishery -2.19 Nonferrous Metal Manufacturing 5.91
Lumber and Wood -2.13 Apparel 6.19
Machinery, Mining -2.13 Mining, Iron 6.50
Professional Services -2.12 Communications, Not Radio/TV 6.94
Electrical Equipment -2.03 Chemicals 9.02
Other Agricultural -2.02 Fabrics 9.58
Other Fabricated Metal -2.01 Amusement 10.06
Tobacco -2.01 Livestock (omitted in regression) 10.88
Paper -1.99 Leather 11.70
Textiles, Misc. -1.96 Petroleum and Gas 13.33
Machinery, Misc. -1.83 Mining, Nonferrous 17.08
The table reports estimated dummy variables in a firm-level regression of vertical integration on industry
dummies using U.S. data.
Table A2
Estimated industry dummies for vertical integration(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
(
1
0
)
(
1
1
)
(
1
2
)
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
t
i
m
e
0
.
0
9
0
.
0
2
(
0
.
0
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
x
i
t
y
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
3
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
D
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
-
0
.
1
4
-
0
.
0
1
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
s
p
r
e
a
d
0
.
0
3
7
-
0
.
0
2
3
(
0
.
0
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
1
3
)
E
n
t
r
y
 
t
i
m
e
0
.
0
0
7
0
.
0
0
0
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
A
n
t
i
t
r
u
s
t
-
0
.
2
8
0
.
0
1
(
0
.
1
0
)
(
0
.
0
7
)
L
o
g
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
0
.
2
6
0
.
0
5
0
.
2
7
0
.
0
5
0
.
2
8
0
.
0
5
0
.
2
6
0
.
0
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
0
5
0
.
2
5
0
.
0
4
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
0
1
0
.
4
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
4
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
4
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
4
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
4
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
4
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
6
6
1
,
7
4
7
6
6
1
,
7
4
7
6
6
1
,
5
8
0
6
6
1
,
5
8
0
6
6
1
,
6
9
3
6
6
1
,
6
9
3
6
3
9
,
6
7
7
5
4
5
,
9
2
8
6
6
1
,
7
4
7
6
6
1
,
7
4
7
6
5
5
,
9
2
9
6
5
5
,
9
2
9
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
T
a
b
l
e
 
A
3
V
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
f
i
r
m
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
T
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
f
r
o
m
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
o
f
a
f
i
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
v
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
n
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
o
f
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
,
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
f
o
r
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
a
r
e
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
a
r
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
w
h
e
r
e
n
o
t
e
d
.
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
t
i
m
e
i
s
f
r
o
m
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
e
t
a
l
(
2
0
0
3
)
.
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
c
o
m
p
l
e
x
i
t
y
i
s
a
n
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
n
g
c
o
s
t
s
f
r
o
m
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
e
t
a
l
(
2
0
0
3
)
,
t
h
a
t
h
a
s
b
e
e
n
s
h
o
w
n
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
i
n
o
t
h
e
r
w
o
r
k
(
s
e
e
A
c
e
m
o
g
l
u
a
n
d
J
o
h
n
s
o
n
,
2
0
0
3
)
.
T
h
e
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
i
n
d
e
x
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
o
f
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
(
s
e
e
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
,
2
0
0
4
)
.
T
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
r
a
t
e
s
p
r
e
a
d
i
s
t
h
e
s
p
r
e
a
d
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
a
n
d
b
o
r
r
o
w
i
n
g
r
a
t
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
(
f
r
o
m
y
e
a
r
2
0
0
0
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
d
a
t
a
)
.
E
n
t
r
y
t
i
m
e
i
s
f
r
o
m
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
e
t
a
l
(
2
0
0
3
)
.
T
h
e
 
a
n
t
i
t
r
u
s
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
d
a
t
a
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
a
n
t
i
t
r
u
s
t
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
s
 
i
n
 
D
u
t
z
 
a
n
d
 
H
a
y
r
i
 
(
1
9
9
9
)
.